It is a cardinal mistake to imagine that "this is no
| time to talk peace." It is equally wrong to assume that
| they who do engage in the discussion of peace prospects
| and methods are few in number; that they lack
| intelligence or patriotism and can be disposed of by the
| mere affirmation that they are enemy agents. In no
| country
There are but three ways in which the war can be | brought to an end. They are
|(1) by a decisive military victory for one side | or the other;
(2) by the economic exhaustion | of one or other of the primary belligerents; and
|(3) by negotiation.
|Each of these courses is in itself a problem | demanding the fullest possible public examination. There | is, so we believe, the utmost justification for hearing | and considering what any citizen has to say on the | prospect and the practicality of any or all of them. | There is, on the other hand, no reason under heaven or | out of hell why it should be considered essential to the | winning of the war that they for whom it is to be won | and who have to pay whatever price is involved, should | be silenced while the job is being done.
| In Great Britain two definite schools of peace
| thought have evolved in recent days. The contention of
| one section is that peace is near at hand, the other
| considers it is a very long way off. The first does not
| seek
This question of practicability is an important
| aspect of the difficulties confronting the advocates of
| the "bitter-end". Properly speaking, the onus is on
| them to advance proof that the policy they stand for is
| reasonably capable of accomplishment, and that having
| been secured is worth having. The plea involves a
| justification of the terrible cost of the objective is
| known to necessitate. And it is further their
| obligation to show that in all the aspects of the
| case
We have on the authority of the London correspondent | of the
||
Against this certainty of a prolonged war, as well as
| the uncertainty of a favorable decision even then, the
| negotiators believe that while the armies are facing one
| another peace can be brought about by open consultation
| with the German Socialists as representing the people of
| Germany. It is their conviction that this is the only
| way to bring about a people's peace
Strangely enough support for peace by negotiation
| comes not only from pacifists. It has won the
| unqualified endorsement of the Marquis of Lansdowne, who
| was for some years joint leader of the Unionist party
| with Mr Bonar Law. Behind Lord Lansdowne, who is the
| recognised leader of the extreme Tories, are not only
| the Socialist pacifists, such as Mr Ramsay Macdonald, MP
| and the Radical pacifists, such as Mr Noel Buxton, MP,
| but also some leading Liberals who held Cabinet posts
| under Mr Asquith, such as Lord Buckmaster, Lord
| Lorebarn, and Lord Beauchamp. It is true that Lansdowne
| has not indicated his readiness to confer with German
| Socialists. His position is that he is ready to
|
|
In
| effect, the Lansdowne "lead" invites peace by returning
| the German colonies and surrendering British conquests
| in Palestine and Mesopotamia in exchange for Belgium,
| Servia, and other restorations by Germany.
All of this reveals a willingness to bargain. | Elsewhere in this issue we publish accounts of treaties | entered into during the currency of the war which | provide for territorial enlargements to the special | advantage of certain of the Allies. Pacifists of the | Henderson-McDonald school have insisted these | entanglements were subversive of the Allied war-aims and | should never have been entered into. Lansdowne, | however, apparently argues that as bargains between the | Allies were considered a legitimate expedient in order | to wage war against Germany, bargains with Germany are a | legitimate means of ending it.
|It would be very wrong for it to be assumed that the | case for negotiation as against the "bitter-end" | contention rests on these limited grounds. Primarily | its justification comes from the belief that a military | victory will crush Prussianism but temporarily. Even | assuming a conclusive decision could be ensured before | the end of the 1919 summer, and that its awful price was | cheerfully acquiesced in, it is affirmed that the sequel | would involve at best but a period of preparation for a | vaster and more staggering conflict. The negotiators | hold that the German people, smarting under the sense of | disaster, will not ascribe their woes to Prussian | militarism but to its defeat, and will set to work to | re-establish militarism, so that by its means they may | again try to reach to goal of world domination. | According to this view then a people's peace by | conciliation is the surer way to defeat Prussian | militarism, because the German people when they come to | count up the gains and losses after the war is over, | will realise that Prussian militarism which has misled | and deceived them, is responsible for the burden of | misery and suffering which they have to bear.
| We can be fully assured that the German people will
| continue the struggle