| Saturday Review 7 June 1856: Bagehot> | | The essence of a constitutional system is said to be the | union of responsibility and power. Even the crude | Continental theorists who, in moments of revolution, have | framed ephemeral charters to restrain despotic rulers, have | always made this their cardinal point. That every | ordonnance shall be counter-signed by a responsible | Minister, is the first requisition which the people make | when the reins of government temporarily fall into their | hands. We have seen unnumbered attempts of this kind | within no very remote period, but they have all failed ~~ | sometimes because Governments have recovered strength | to set a nought the promises extorted from their fears. But | much more frequently, at least in the earlier stages of | reaction, because the machinery for bringing the Minister | to account has refused to work, the signature has become | an empty form, and the promised responsibility a sham and | a delusion. Of course there is no end to the complacent | contempt with which Englishmen regard such efforts to | transplant the theory which we alone, it is supposed, have | been able to put into a working shape. Many persons | among us are apt to look upon Responsible Government | as a monopoly of which we alone have the patent, and we | are afraid that there is something very like satisfaction in | the feeling with which we witness the break-down of a | modern paper constitution. On such occasions, the leading | journal becomes philosophic, and talks historic twaddle | about the rise of British liberty. We are reminded that it is | only by the efforts of ages, by civil wars and Parliamentary | struggles, by constitutional maxims ingrained into the | whole body politic, and by the watchful jealousy of the | Commons of England, that we have at length succeeded in | giving substance to that which elsewhere is but a phantom | ~~ the idea of Responsible Government. Our judges are | responsible to Parliament, and are raised above the | influence of the Crown. Our Ministers are responsible to | the House of Commons, and our Honourable Members to | the constituencies that return them. The heads of | departments are responsible for the appointments which | they make; and subordinates have to answer to their | immediate superiors. No functionary, from the highest to | the lowest, can enjoy the possession of authority without | finding himself liable to be called to account for his | administration. Even the Press, unfettered as it is by law, | must submit to the restraints which its commercial | necessities impose. Everywhere there is check and | counter-check; and though this somewhat complex | machinery may at times impede our progress in reform, or | impair our efficiency in action, it compensates for the | inconvenience by securing the personal responsibility of | those who are entrusted with power. So, at least, we are | told. Elderly law lords dwell upon the venerable theory with | solemn unction. Statesmen repeat the platitude, and the | people accept it as an axiomatic, though somewhat | tiresome truism. An experienced member of Parliament or | an old Cabinet Minister would no more think of questioning | this fundamental doctrine ~~ at least, in public ~~ than of | disputing the title of her Majesty to the throne. And yet how | wonderfully little truth there is in this account of our | institutions, if brought to the test of sober fact! | Take the case of judicial responsibility. Does | anyone in his senses suppose that | we owe the purity of the Bench to the dread of an address | from Parliament for the removal of an unjust judge? Are we | to be told that the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice | would give corrupt judgments but for the sense of personal | responsibility under which they exercise their functions? | The real safeguard is something very different from any | constitutional check. it is to be found in the temper of | society, which would not tolerate judicial iniquity, and in the | tone of the Bar from which our judges are selected. | Anyone who has worked his way to | a position which gives him the slightest chance of elevation | to the bench, has gone through a moral education which | makes it well nigh impossible that he should corrupt the | fountain of justice. In other respects, he may be anything | but faultless. he may be a profligate of a spendthrift. It is | quite possible that the mantle of a judge may fall upon a | man whose private honour is at least questionable, though, | happily, such instances are extremely rare. But, be he what | he may, the wilful and corrupt abuse of judicial power is an | offence which, in the actual condition of society, may be | practically regarded as an impossibility; and it is one of | which the bitterest cynic would never dream of accusing an | English judge. | The state of feeling to which we owe the uprightness of the | bench is, no doubt, a far more effectual security against the | perversion of justice than any artificial responsibility which | could be devised. And yet orthodox statesmen still repeat | the hackneyed phrase of the responsibility of the judges, | as if that were the real guarantee for the due administration | of the laws. It was only the other day, for example, that the | Lord Chancellor attempted to defend the existing appellate | system of the House of Lords ~~ a system which | practically allows him, under certain circumstances of no | very rare occurrence, to sit alone ~~ by magnifying the | importance of concentrating responsibility on a single head. | says Lord Cranworth, . The argument | might possibly be sound if dishonest judgments were the | evil to be feared. But it is not for want of honesty, but for | want of wisdom, that the appellate jurisdiction of the Lords | has fallen into disrepute; and the Chancellor himself would | perhaps admit the truth of the old maxim that two heads | are better than one, even though the one be his own. His | argument, in fact, is only an illustration of the hold which | the venerable superstition of the responsibility of the Bench | has taken of his, as well as of many other minds. | The fiction of the responsibility of Ministers is even more | universally believed than that of judicial responsibility, but | surely with no better reason. For how is a Minister made to | answer for a breach of duty? If a member of a Cabinet be | ever so much to blame, his colleagues are, according to | modern maxims, bound to stand by him to the last. If they | can command a majority, the delinquent is absolved; and | even if they are beaten, the only result is, that the Ministry | goes out a month, or a year, before it would have broken | up in the natural course of things, and the vacant places | are temporarily occupied by others, who may perhaps have | been expelled, under precisely similar circumstances, a | year or two earlier. The offender is merely condemned to | share the brief ostracism of his fellows, and complacently | crosses the House with the full assurance of returning to | his old position with the next oscillation of the party | see-saw. Such responsibility is obviously a nullity, and serves | only to secure the country against being governed, for the | time, by the clique which happen to be guilty of the most | recent offence. A man who may have proved himself | unworthy as a Minister some three years ago is not | necessarily more deserving of power than one who may | prove himself unworthy to-day; yet our only practical | alternative, speaking generally, is to exchange one | obnoxious Cabinet for another, which a short time before | stood in the same predicament. This is the Ministerial | responsibility of which we are so proud, and which forms | the theme of so many ponderous disquisitions in the House | of Commons. The phrase, in fact, passes current in | political circles just as if it embodied a reality, and it would | doubtless be deemed a gross breach of Parliamentary | etiquette to breathe a whisper against the conventional | hypothesis. | In a debate not many weeks ago, a highly respectable | member enlarged with becoming gravity on the | responsibility which a Minister felt in making subordinate | appointments in the Civil Service. This was carrying the | joke too far, and provoked Mr. Gladstone into stating the | undoubted fact, that to talk of the responsibility involved in | the selection of a tide-waiter is simply ridiculous. He might, | with almost equal justice, have said as much of the whole | theory of Ministerial responsibility. It merely amounts to this | ~~ A Whig is responsible for every fault which he may have | committed, so long as the Tories possess a majority. Let | the balance, however, turn the other way, and he may | wield his authority for the time with as little chance of being | called to account as an Eastern despot or a French | Emperor. In theory, his offences may lead, it is true, to an | impeachment; but in practice, the only fault for which he | can be visited is the unpardonable sin of belonging to the | party which happens to be outnumbered in the Lower | House. Once, and once only, of late years, has Parliament | attempted to exercise its prerogative of vengeance; and | then, with a nice discrimination in blundering, it selected for | its victims the very men who had struggled most earnestly | to avert the calamities which aroused its indignation. The | experiment will hardly be tried again. The truth is, under | the established system of governing cliques and party | organization, the House of Commons is incapable of | enforcing the responsibility of any member of the | Administration; nor can we see any probable change of | system calculated materially to diminish the immunity | which modern Cabinets practically enjoy. | We are not sanguine enough to look for the establishment | of a responsible Government, at least in our time. We are | not even sure that the notion of responsibility by rules and | systems is more than a chimera. We think it high time that | the prevailing cant upon the subject fell into disuse; and we | trust that the gradual improvement of society may infuse | into political life the same high-minded sense of duty which | has superseded the imaginary responsibility of judicial | functionaries. The consummation may as yet be far off, but | we prefer the prospect of a distant reality to the delusion of | an existing sham. Much will depend on public opinion. The | measure of virtue which society requires from public men | will ultimately become that which they will demand of | themselves. Many symptoms indicate that the prevailing | laxity of opinion on this subject is undergoing a material | change, and it is on an improvement in this respect that we | rely to cure the lax practice of the governing classes, and | to raise the tone of political morality among public men. | Meanwhile, the less we trust to the supposed responsibility | of officials, the less likely we are to deceive ourselves.