| <Saturday Review 1 March 1856: Lewes>
| <Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Psychology>
| An original book on Psychology ~~ that is to say, a book 
| which is original in the sense of all its ideas having been 
| thought out by the author for himself, and not simply adopted 
| by him from others ~~ must excite the attention of all 
| students, and earn their gratitude, however it may on some 
| points arouse their antagonism, and teach what seems to 
| them error. Such a book Mr. Herbert Spencer has written. It 
| is original in the true sense of the word, but not in the merely 
| capricious departure from current opinions which some 
| writers fondly imagine to be originality. It is new in its leading 
| ideas, new in conception, new in illustration, while it is 
| nevertheless a continuation and development of lines of 
| thought which science has gradually been preparing; so that 
| many of its conclusions will only seem like the definite 
| expression of opinions which the reader has had floating in 
| his mind for some years. The style is clear, somewhat 
| monotonous, but never equivocal or misty ~~ the illustrations 
| are numerous, and often felicitous ~~ the spirit earnest and 
| sincere. For vigour of mind and logical consistency, there are 
| few works which we could place above it; although, in spite 
| of the systematic thinking which each section exhibits, we 
| have to regret a certain fragmentary incompleteness in the 
| structure of the whole, which the ill-health pleaded in the 
| preface may explain without wholly excusing. Instead of 
| calling his book <hi> Principles of Psychology, </hi> Mr. 
| Spencer would perhaps have caused less disappointment 
| had he called it <hi> Essays towards a New System of 
| Psychology. </hi>
| Regarded in the light of essays, the novelty and importance 
| of the ideas here set forth command serious attention. We 
| do not say that our readers will acquiesce in Mr. Spencer’s 
| views ~~ on the contrary, we are certain that his denial of 
| free-will, and his identification of Mind with Life, although not 
| aggressively advanced, will rouse resolute opposition. But 
| antagonism is not inconsistent with respect; and Mr. Spencer 
| is too sincere, and is too remarkable a thinker, not to ensure 
| courteous attention from adversaries. We shall not, in the 
| limited space at our disposal, enter upon any controversy 
| with him; but we shall endeavour to indicate, as briefly as 
| possible, the nature of the speculations which he has 
| unfolded in this work.
| One peculiarity in Mr. Spencer’s system is, that he seems to 
| have approached Psychology through the avenues of 
| science. He has not been a student of the old psychology ~~ 
| he has sat at the feet of no professor, learning from him what 
| the schools had thought and taught. He seems very slightly 
| acquainted with the writings of that illustrious line of thinkers 
| from Aristotle to Hegel, who have tried to solve the great 
| problems <p> “Of fate, fore-knowledge, free-will absolute.” 
| </p>
| He has approached the subject from another point. His 
| studies of Life have gradually led him to the more complex 
| problems of Mind; and once engaged in these inquiries, he 
| has cast about, not very widely, for assistance from the 
| metaphysicians, though he has apparently only gained from 
| them the aid of definite contradiction. Hence his remarks on 
| Kant, Hume, and Sir W. Hamilton, which are purely critical 
| and polemical, are, if we remember rightly, the only 
| passages in which the psychological schools are recognised 
| at all. Had his treatise been more obviously systematic than 
| it is, we should perhaps have had some explicit statement of 
| his method. He would have told us where physiology ends, 
| and Psychology begins, and would have answered many 
| other questions which must arise during the study of his 
| work.
| He begins with an inquiry into the validity of consciousness, 
| and tries to settle that primary demand of all speculation ~~ 
| What criterion have we for the truth of any belief? Seeing 
| that men have doubted even the existence of an external 
| world, and advanced philosophic arguments in support of 
| their scepticism, he naturally seeks to lay a firm basis for his 
| own and for every other system, by ascertaining whether any 
| criterion is available. He finds one in the <p> “universal 
| postulate” </p> <p> “every belief contrary of which is 
| unthinkable must be true.” </p>
| He next proceeds to analyze every kind of cognition into its 
| simplest component elements, commencing with the most 
| complex forms, such as compound quantitative reasoning, 
| and descending, through the less complex forms, till he 
| finally arrives at the fundamental characteristic of all thought. 
| Every <hi> compound </hi> quantitative argument is 
| resolved into a series of <hi> simple </hi> quantitative 
| arguments, and these all involve the establishment of the 
| relations of equality. All cognition, simple as well as 
| compound, is thus shown to depend on the establishment of 
| the relation of <hi> likeness. </hi> The whole of these 
| chapters, which include the first two parts of the volume, will 
| be read by every student with admiration for their profound 
| and lucid analysis of very difficult and delicate questions, 
| and with only an occasional and unimportant dissent from 
| the conclusions they establish. But with the two remaining 
| parts it will be different, because in them the synthetical 
| originality of the author leads him to conclusions which 
| cannot hope for much acceptance from the English public ~~ 
| as our readers will gather from the following brief intimation.
| Bodily life and mental life Mr. Spencer regards as two 
| divisions of Life in general, related to each other as species 
| of which Life is the genus. He first treats of bodily Life, 
| defining it to be <q> </q> and in rapid yet masterly sketches, 
| he shows how the simple homogeneous forms of life 
| gradually become more and more complex and 
| heterogeneous as the adjustment of internal to external 
| relations becomes more complex and special. He then treats 
| of mental life in a similar way, from the earliest form of 
| contractility to that of simple sensibility, upwards to 
| perceptions, instincts, feelings, and the highest processes of 
| ratiocination; in one and all of which he finds what he finds in 
| the bodily life, namely, <q> </q>. This is an exposition of 
| psychical phenomena which will find little favour except with 
| those who advocate materialism.
| Argument with Mr. Spencer on topics like these would be 
| ineffectual in such space as a weekly journal could afford; 
| and we must leave his positions, therefore, to be met by the 
| reader in his own study. In closing our brief notice, we 
| cannot help one reflection. Whatever pain may be felt at 
| finding so remarkable an intellect on the side of opinions 
| which most readers must regard as opposed to their most 
| cherished convictions, there will be a counterbalancing 
| pleasure and a high moral influence in the contact with a 
| mind so thoroughly earnest and sincere in the search after 
| truth as every page of this work shows Mr. Spencer’s to be.